![]() ![]() I also characterize the optimal party-government relationship: the secretary should sometimes dominate over the governor in public good provision but not always the case. The arrangement forestalls local attempts to challenge the autocrat and establishes the autocrat's confidence to promote meritocracy and decentralization. The party secretary controls political power, while the governor commands the provision of the public good. Through a game-theoretical model, I show that one-party state can potentially solve the dilemma by appointing both a party secretary and a governor to co-rule a province. An autocrat usually refuses to appoint a competent governor with a broad discretionary power because the governor can use his competence and discretion to challenge the autocrat. The second chapter focuses on another critical dilemma in an autocracy, the loyalty-competence trade-off. Firm-level panel data from China are further consistent with the main predictions from my model. In other words, the combination of rotation and merit-based evaluation achieves both commitment and strong flexibility, a property rarely satisfied by other commitment devices. This allows new firms to enter the market, which sustains Schumpeterian "creative destruction" and long-term growth. An extension of the model also demonstrates that rotation and merit-based evaluation reduces politicians' entrenched interests in existing firms. The key finding is that, although rotation or merit-based evaluation alone actually makes the holdup problem even worse, it is exactly their combination that can form a credible constraint on politicians to solve the hold-up problem and thus encourages private investment. Meritocratic plutocracy how to#With a game-theoretical model, I investigate how to constrain politicians through rotation of local politicians and meritocratic evaluation of politicians based on economic growth. The first chapter investigates the puzzle why entrepreneurs invest actively in many autocracies where unconstrained politicians may heavily expropriate the entrepreneurs. Methodologically, the dissertation utilizes a combination of economic modeling, original data collection, and empirical analysis. The three essays of the dissertation elaborate on the various solutions to these dilemmas, as well as problems associated with these solutions. Yet the grave dilemmas in bureaucratic governance are also well recognized. The question is fundamental, as merit-based rewards and promotion of politicians are the cornerstones of key authoritarian regimes such as China. This dissertation explores how to solve incentive problems in autocracies through institutional arrangements centered around political meritocracy. ![]()
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